Introduction
The lack of startup capital is a major obstacle for entrepreneurs who want to start a new business. In a recently published article, using a sample of startups from 2004, Robb and Robinson (2014) argue that startups in the US rely more on outside debt financing through bank loans than is commonly thought. Our study complements Robb and Robinson's (2014) but uses empirical data for new corporate firms in Sweden that were founded after the financial crises in 2007. We find that bank loans are not an important source of finance, and we add to their study by drawing attention to the fact that the definition of outside debt financing depends on the legal status of a firm. A corporate startup differs from other legal forms in his respect since there is a separation of the wealth of the firm and the owners (Hansmann et al 2006 and Kraakman et al 2009) . In addition earlier research about financing of startup 3 , we claim that location is important to consider in analyses of finance and the performance of startups.
An important aspect of the analysis of financing and performance is that location matters, as Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2008) express in the title of their paper "Proximity still matters in the location of economic activity". There is extensive literature on geographical knowledge spillover and regional growth. (For an overview, see, e.g., Döring and Schelling (2004) .) Inspired by the increasing research that examines closeness and knowledge spillovers in regions, we will investigate whether regional location has any effects on the financing and expansion plans of startups.
The aim of the paper is thus to fill two perceived gaps in the literature viz. the legal implication of the corporate form for external financing and the implication of location for financing and expansion. The research questions are: How does the corporate form matter for what can be considered the external financing of startups, and how does location matter for expansion plans and financing?
The discussion of the implications of corporate form for external financing is based upon a law and economics analysis of what makes the corporate form different from other legal forms and results from a questionnaire sent solely to new Swedish firms of a corporate form.
All responding firms are family firms. In the questionnaire, we ask questions about financing 3 See Table 1 in section 2.1.1 for an overview of earlier research. of the startup, difficulties perceived in applying for bank loans and the extent to which personal collateral and guarantees were necessary to get a bank loan.
To fulfill the second aim of the paper, to analyze the effect of location on financing and expansion plans, the survey data are complemented with detailed firm data from Bureau van Dijk´s Amadeus database. Information about expansion plans are from the questionnaire, whereas financial data originate both from the questionnaire and Amadeus. A division into three OECD-defined functional regions is thereby made. 4 The three function regions are denoted predominantly rural, intermediate and predominantly urban. Owner characteristics are used as control variables in a regression analysis of how regions matter for finance and expansion.
One primary finding in our paper is that a majority of the startups in our sample do not use bank loans. A bank loan is used by only 19.3 percent of the firms. Furthermore, in response to a question of personal collateral and personal guarantees, 68 percent of the respondents said that it had been a requirement for obtaining the loan. As will further developed in the paper, these responses underline our critique that what in earlier research has been characterized as an external source of credit financing is, to a large extent, not an external source. It is instead an internal source of finance provided by the owners using their own assets to finance the startups.
According to our study, banks do not want to take the risk of lending to startups. In contrast to many earlier studies based on US data (Berger and Udell, 1998, and Robinson, 2014) , we find that bank financing is not important for corporate startups. The information asymmetry gap between banks and entrepreneurs is not bridged. Banks are extremely risk adverse in their lending decisions.
A second primary finding is that expansion plans differ geographically between rural, intermediate and densely populated urban regions. Firms in densely populated urban regions are more prone to expansion abroad, whereas intermediate regions are more focused on expansion on the home market. Furthermore, bank loans are more frequently obtained by firms in rural than in urban areas.
To sum up, the present study contributes to the literature on the financing of startups by concentrating on how the corporate form of startups matters for the distinction between external and internal financing. Our study finds that the financing is of an internal character. 4 OECD is an abbreviation for The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
By being dependent on internal finance, the startup fits into characteristics used to define family firms (concentrated ownership and no separation between owner and manager).
The study also contributes by looking at how location and entrepreneurial character matter for expansion plans and finance. The opaque information about the profit opportunities that characterize new firms seem to be able surmountable in rural areas, according to our results. This is an area for future research.
Associated with transfer of information and knowledge between firms is also the result that being in an urban location makes the startups more prone to expand their business. In more densely populated urban areas, the expansion plans include expansion abroad. In other words, the expansion of family business startups seems to be influenced by the nature of knowledge spillovers in regions. Borrowing from the field of regional economics can in this sense increase our knowledge of family business startups (Rodriquez and Basco 2011) The study is divided into four different sections. In the next section, we will discuss the theoretical framework that we will use and earlier research. In the third section, we present the methodology and results from the survey and regressions. Finally, section 4 concludes the study.
Theoretical framework

Startups and Financing
This part provides a theoretical background on the analysis of the responses to a questionnaire sent out to startups. Information about the questionnaire and analyses of the answers are provided in section 3.1. Schumpeter (1947) identified innovations as a factor that eases the constraints on production and consumption and labeled the persons initiating the changes in constraints as entrepreneurs. The innovators were new firms with new innovative ideas. As was also noticed by Schumpeter, entrepreneurs need capital to pursue innovations; therefore, the financing of innovations becomes critical for economic growth. The key economic challenge is determining how to combine new ideas and capital such that successful innovations and growth are promoted. Sustained growth primarily emanates from innovative business ventures. Entrepreneurs with innovative ideas need to be connected with financiers.
Financing and the double trust dilemma
However, the financing of innovations has to overcome what Cooter and Schäfer (2012) in a recent book have called "the problem of double trust". The financier wants assurance that the investment is sound, and the entrepreneur wants to make sure that business ideas are not stolen. A common issue for all firms is determining how to overcome this double trust problem where financiers are concerned about getting invested money back and entrepreneurs are concerned about the protection of business ideas. 5 The root of the problem is asymmetric information about the qualities of the entrepreneur and the business ideas and the qualities of the financier. There is a fear that the other party will take advantage of private information, behave opportunistically and take the money or steal the business idea. Both parties have to be induced to convey trustworthy information about quality to each other.
Due to the double trust problem, financing solutions vary as firms grow large (see Berger and Udell, 1998 and Cooter and Schäfer, 2014) . For a startup with a new business idea, the financing problem is severe. There is no historical record to fall back on when establishing contact with a financier. To safely inform financiers about the value of new ideas is difficult.
The only way to obtain financing is, in many instances, to turn to family and friends. Cooter and Schäfer (2012) call this relational financing.
The information impactedness is a term used by Oliver Williamson (1975) to describe a situation in which the parties entering into a transaction both have considerable private information. The relationship between a startup firm and a financier has that character. The information about the profit opportunities of the startup is opaque. There is no history of the firm, and business plans have to be transmitted in a trustworthy and clear way (see Berger and Udell (1998) and Peterson and Rajan (1994) ). In line with the transaction cost analysis used by Williamson (1975) , the high transaction costs caused by information and the fear of 5 The double trust problem can also be denoted as a moral hazard problem because it refers to post contractual incentives to take advantage at the other party's expense. opportunism make financing from people other than owners problematic. A vertical integration type of financing with financing provided by owners (inside financing) is favored because of the transaction problems.
The double trust problem outlined makes outside equity financing (i.e., financing provided by people other than the owners) particularly difficult. An outside provider of equity financing will require rather extensive information about the business idea and profit opportunities and require control, which represents a potential threat that the entrepreneur will not reap the profits of the firm. The entrepreneur who just started a company is likely too anxious to maintain control to realize her/his business idea (see, e.g., Melin & Nordqvist, 2007) .
Bank loans are, from this perspective, more attractive because the bank only has a claim to the nominal amount of the loan and interest on the loan. However, the bank wants to be assured that these nominal amounts are paid in due time. Collateral and personal guarantees are ways for the entrepreneur to make the bank trust the repayment of loans and interest. Hence, a prerequisite is often the existence of collateral (and personal guarantees) as safeguards for bank loans. Often, a startup of corporate form does not have the required collateral as a backup for a bank loan. Instead, personal assets have to be used as safeguards for bank loans.
The corporate firm and outside financing
The firm as a separate legal person is important in our paper. The strongest type of separate legal person is the corporate form of business. A corporation is a separate legal person that can own property and sign binding contracts (see, e.g., Kraakman et al 2009 ). An implication of this is that it is the firm (the judicial person), not any physical persons, that owns assets.
This strong form of legal personality is a prerequisite for the limited liability and perpetual life and profit maximization features that characterize the corporation as a legal form of business.
Partnership offers a much weaker separation between legal and physical persons, and sole proprietorship is the weakest one, with the identity of the firm as a physical person. A partnership firm is a legal person, but it is not a separate legal person from the owners in the same sense as for a corporation. The responsibility for contractual claims on the firm ultimately rests with the owners in a partnership. The third legal form, sole proprietorship, is not a legal person at all. The firm is from a contractual point of view identical to the owner.
That the firm is a legal person is one of three important aspects of the corporate form of business. The other two are the limited liability of shareholders and the transferability of ownership of shares (Hansmann et al 2006 and Kraakman et al 2009) . That the firm is a legal person implies that the assets of the firm are shielded from the owners' personal creditors, and limited liability, in turn, shields the assets of the owner from the firm's creditors. The third aspect, the transferability of ownership of shares, depends on the first two by making the personal wealth of a new owner irrelevant as long as the share price is paid. In this way, ownership can be made impersonal, and thereby, a large amount of risk capital be accumulated. However, this third aspect, the transferability of ownership of shares, is not as important for startups as for firms in need of capital at later stages of their development.
The fact that corporations are characterized by a double shielding where the assets of a firm are shielded from the creditors of the owner and the assets of the owner are shielded from the firm's creditors has implications for the characterization of bank loans as external or internal financing. If the supply of financing from the owner is considered internal financing, all bank loans with assets of the owner as collateral or the wealth of the owner serving as personal guarantee are internal financing. The bank has given the loan to the owner and not to the firm as a separate legal person.
The firm as a nexus of contracts and financing alternatives
A firm can be viewed as a web of contractual relations (Jensen and Meckling, 1975) . It is a legal entity, and it can, just like a physical person, enter into binding agreements (contracts) with other physical and legal persons. From this perspective, the firm can be seen as a "nexus of contracts" that coordinates financial investors, suppliers of intermediate goods, services and labor and customers in the production of goods and services. Figure 1 shows the firm from such a contractual perspective. (Contracts refer here to both formal and informal agreements.) It is a simplified stylized depiction of the firm as a legal person, production unit and nexus of contracts. Outside the figure are the authorities (national and communal) that supply a necessary supporting infrastructure of public goods, such as a legal system and a transportation network.
On the financial side of the firm, there are lenders (investors) with fixed claims contracts (e.g., banks). In contrast to shareholders, they have specified claims on the firm in terms of mortgage plans, maturity and interest claims. If the firm cannot meet these fixed claims, it can be forced into liquidation/bankruptcy. The remuneration that lenders (and also suppliers of inputs) can obtain is then dependent on the value of assets for other than the bankrupted (liquidating) corporation. Fungible assets with a well-functioning second-hand market are valuable to others and can therefore serve as collateral for loans. Consequently, firms that own such assets can, to a larger extent than other firms, use these loans as a source of finance (Williamson, 1988) .
Figure 1:
The firm as a nexus of contracts 6 6 The figure is inspired by Ståhl (1976) and Bjuggren and Palmberg (2009) figure 1 is of interest from a financial perspective as sources of alternative forms of financing. Handling cash-flows are, in addition to the financing of assets, important for the survival and development of a startup. To avoid situations of financial distress that can result in liquidation, the cash-flows have to be synchronized so that bills can be timely paid (see Wruck 1990) . If the result of a financial distress situation is that the value of the assets of the firm are not considered large enough to cover creditors' claims, the firm can be forced into liquidation (see, e.g., Bjuggren 1995) .
The nexus of contracts that constitutes the firm is sensitive to different types of disturbances.
An obvious example of such a disturbance is bankruptcy. Both a bankruptcy of the firm itself due to solvency problems and bankruptcies amongst suppliers and customers can result in the destruction of valuable asset specificities. These problems have been described by, among others, Williamson (1988) and Bjuggren (1995) .
The financial needs of a startup can, to some extent, be met by adjusting the relationships with suppliers, employees and customers and taking a closer look at the composition of assets. These types of strategies are called financial bootstrapping and are defined by Winborg and Landström (2000, p. 238) as "the use of methods to meet the need for resources, without relying on longterm external finance". In accordance with Winborg and Landström (2000) , the need for financing assets can be reduced by having used equipment instead of new, borrowing equipment from other firms and lending equipment to other firms, leasing equipment, running the business at home, sharing premises and equipment with other businesses and minimizing the capital invested in stock.
In relation to suppliers and customers, the need for external financing can be alleviated by bartering, coordinating purchases with other businesses, offering discounts for cash payment, receiving advance payment from customers, using factoring, charging interest on overdue payments from customers, choosing customers who pay quickly and buying on credit. The cost for labor can be reduced by hiring personnel for shorter periods and sharing employees with other businesses. The owner can personally also contribute by temporarily withholding her own salary and sometimes using her own credit cards. The use of financial bootstrapping hence boils down to reconsidering the contractual relations with the shareholder (owner), employees, suppliers and customers, as shown in figure 1.
Empirical evidence
There are several studies on the financing of startups. Table 1 provides a summary of earlier studies of importance for this paper. A couple of the earlier studies are descriptive (Berger and Udell, 1998 and Robinson, 2014 Another often cited early study is Berger and Udell (1998) . It is a descriptive study that is famous for a discussion of how financing changes in firms in different stages of their development from startups to public listed firms. In contrast to the perceived wisdom, they find that startups, to a large extent, are externally financed. The dominant form of external finance is bank loans. These bank loans are, to a large extent, backed up by safeguards of personal assets used as collateral and personal guarantees. All data in Berger and Udell (1998) are from a survey, the National Survey of Small Business Finances. Book values are used dating from 1993. No special distinction is made between the legal statuses of the firm (i.e., between sole proprietorship, partnership and corporations) in the analysis of the financial structure.
Two studies that use leverage defined as debt divided by assets as a dependent variable are by Cassar (2004) and Colombo and Grilli (2007) . They find, respectively, that size of assets increases leverage and that the existence of many owners decrease leverage. Colombo and Grilli (2007) also find for high-tech firms in Italy that few startups use bank loans. This finding contrasts with the general picture of US startups provided by Berger and Udell (1998) and Robb and Robinson (2014) . Both find that there are plenty of bank loans available for startups. Coleman, Cotei and Farhat (2014) . They found for the US that firm characteristics such as asset size and net worth, along with ownership characteristics such as work experience and ethnicity, explained debt-equity choices.
A recently published similar study using US data is by Robb and Robinson (2014) . They use data from a survey, the Kauffman Firm Survey, which tracks nearly 5000 firms founded in 2004. They follow these firms during the period 2004 to 2011. No distinction between legal statuses is made in the data analysis. They find an important role for banks in providing capital to startups. However, Gartner, Frid and Alexander (2012) find in their study of US nascent entrepreneurs that only 19.8 percent of the financing was bank loans.
The last column in Table 1 shows what we consider main limitations in the light of the aims of this paper. Common to all articles with exception of Coleman, Cotei and Farhat (2014) is that there is no regional perspective. However, they do not study the impact of location on growth, which is one of our aims. Several articles have legal status as an explanatory variable.
But no article use legal status to explain differences in character of bank loans to corporations, sole proprietorship and partnership, which is the other aim of this article.
Startup, financing and geography
One of the papers listed in Table 1 (Coleman et al 2014) had geographical region as an independent variable to explain the debt-equity decision of startups. They found no significance for geographical region as a determinant of debt-equity. Geographical region is also used in this paper as an explanatory variable. The focus is not only on debt-equity but also on expansion plans and bank loans. Three different strands of theories within economic geography and regional economics serve as framework for our study of how location matters for the expansion and financing of startups.
The first strand of theories originates within the field of geography, spillovers and growth.
Two early seminal papers in this field are by Krugman (1990) and Romer (1990) . Krugman (1990) stresses the importance of the concentration of economic activities to understand how growth differs between regions, and Romer presents a model of endogenous growth where spillovers of knowledge were an important ingredient. Bosma et al (2008) investigate in an empirical paper how agglomeration effects have affected startups in the Netherlands. In contrast to our study, they look at how the rate of startups is affected by agglomeration.
Brewton et al (2010) study how resilience to negative unforeseen circumstances differs between family firms in rural and urban areas. In contrast to these two papers, we look at how expansion and financing are affected by startups already in place. Our study gets inspiration from a number of papers that have been published on the topic of agglomeration, productivity and exports. Examples of three recent studies are Greenaway and Kneller (2008), Koenig (2009) and Antonietti and Cainelli (2009) . They all find a positive connection between export and agglomeration economics. Expanding non-codified knowledge of how to proceed is important. Based on their research, a positive relationship between population density and plans for expansion is expected. The hypotheses are that startups in urban regions will primarily consider expansion at home, whereas startups in more densely populated metropolitan urban areas also plan expansion abroad.
The second strand of theories is about how banks in regionalized networks can overcome the problems of information impactedness and opportunism (Pollard, 2003) . This paper is, in this aspect of regional accessibility to bank loans, inspired by a paper by Backman (2013) . Based on how proximity can matter, she studies the relationship between startups and local access to banks. She uses data from Statistics Sweden from 2010 and finds that startups in rural areas are more dependent on presence of local banks than startups in urban areas. In light of these two studies, it can, in this study, be expected that firms in predominantly rural areas should be more dependent on bank loans and have a capital structure with a larger proportion of debt relative to equity. An earlier descriptive study of SMEs by Berggren and Silver (2010) also finds that bank loans are more important as a source of finance in small municipalities. They use survey data from 459 firms. Firms located in small towns with populations in the interval 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants and municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants stated that their most important external financiers were banks. The explanation offered was that banks are essentially the only external financial source available in more sparsely populated regions.
Based on their empirical works, the hypothesis in this paper is also that bank loans are more available in rural areas.
A third strand of theories discusses how the firms shall be depicted in economic geography.
Taylor and Asheim (2001) Coleman et al 2013) . In this paper, the ownership characteristics will be used as control variables in the analysis of how location influences the financing and expansion of startups.
Methodology and analysis
The survey
The time period investigated in our study is 2009 to 2013. During this period, there were 272 376 startups in Sweden. The majority of these startups had sole proprietorship. The number of firms with the corporate form of business was 82 809, i.e., 30 percent of all startups. Startups of the corporate form increased from 2010. The increase can be explained by the decrease of the legally required minimum equity from SEK 100 000 to 50 000, which was introduced 2010.
An organization with the purpose of giving free advice to startups is the Swedish Jobs and Society Foundation (NyföretagarCentrum). We used their membership register in our survey.
In 2012, there were 9400 startups listed with the Swedish Jobs and Society Foundation, i.e., approximately 13 percent of all startups that were founded in Sweden in that year. Of these 9400 startups, 3000 were corporations. The Swedish Jobs and Society Foundation helped us by
providing the e-mail addresses of corporation startups listed with them.
A survey was sent to 2500 corporations introduced from 2009 to 2013 out of which 244
answered the questions in the survey, i.e., approximately 10 per cent (see Table 2 ). The (2012) i.e. on average 46 percent which is close what we have in our sample. As the service sector is the one with less of fixed assets that can serve as collaterals we think that our sample is not so wrong. The respondents (founders) had, on average, 21.5 years of working experience (see Table 3 ).
8 Table 3 further reveals that 63 percent of the respondents were male and 85 percent were born in Sweden. The mean age was 47 years with a spread between 23 and 69 years. A majority had studied at the university level and had an academic degree. Slightly more than half of the entrepreneurs had no earlier experience of starting a business. Almost 28 percent had experience from one earlier startup and 13 percent, from two earlier startups. Experience from more than two earlier startups was rare. Note: *The questionnaire did not make it possible to separate working experience in general from working experience in the startup sector
Corporate ownership characteristics:
The questionnaire was sent out to the founder of each startup. The respondent was often also the CEO. Furthermore, the respondent was, in the majority of the cases, the sole owner or a shared owner with another person. All firms were a closely held firm according to the Swedish 3:12 rules. The 3:12 rules mandate that for firms in which four or fewer owners control more than 50 percent of the ultimate voting rights, special tax conditions apply. Bjuggren et al (2011) has used this tax rule to estimate the prevalence of family firms in Sweden. With access to the number of owners and knowledge of whether a firm uses 3:12 rules, they can state whether a private firm has a concentration of more than 50 percent of votes for one owner. In the tax definition of an owner, family members are included. Most commonly in our survey, there was one owner of the startup (70 percent of cases). Using the same criterion as Bjuggren et al (2011) , with one family owning more than 50 percent of the votes, we could conclude that 100 percent of the startups are family firms.
Results
Financing characteristics
Looking at financial sources, founder equity dominates as a financial source (see Table 4 ).
Equity from family and friends is rare and amounts to a small percentage of financing when used. Business angels and venture capital are non-existent at the startup time. There are also only a few instances where these actors appear afterwards. Government subsidies are rather rare. Turning to debt financing, bank loans and founder loans dominate but are not as prevalent as founder equity. Loans from government and family and friends are less frequent. This result of a dominating role for founder equity in the financing of startups is in stark contrast to the findings of two earlier US studies (Berger and Udell, 1998 and Robinson, 2014) and a study of the UK (Cosh et al, 2009) . They stressed that access to bank loans was not a bottleneck in the financing of startups. Instead, they found that credit from financial institutions dominated as a source of finance. Our study with Swedish data shows that bank loans are really not an important source of finance. The founder loan is almost of equal magnitude.
However, there are alternatives to long-term financing to handle the financing operations of a firm. These alternatives, presented in relation to our nexus of contracts, are called bootstrapping and can be used to mitigate financial risk. In Table 5 , a dichotomous scale present the prevalence of bootstrapping methods. It turned out that saving on assets by running the business from home was common. Also fairly common was sharing premises with others. Handling cash flows by withholding one's own salary and using one's own private cards were also common. More than 30 percent of respondents also used assignments (credits) as a way to handle cash flow and saved on assets by sharing equipment with other businesses. 
Bank financing experiences
What explains our result that bank loans are not so common in the financing of startups? As noted, this result deviates from earlier findings in the US and UK. A question in our questionnaire about the experiences startups have had when applying for bank loans can provide a hint. It is worth noting that this was an open-ended question in the survey with no pre-determined alternatives. In response to a question about the perceived difficulties of getting bank loans, 84 startups answered that they had had difficulties.
In total, 47 of 244 respondents received bank loans (19.3 percent of the firms) but not without problems. 9 Table 6 shows the number and percentage of the 47 firms that use bank loans who have answered the questions about the difficulties in applying for bank loans. Of this firms, 53 percent reported that they had previously been denied bank loans or abstained from applying because of perceived difficulties, whereas 43 % had not been denied bank loans. Sixty-eight percent had had to put up personal collateral and personal guarantees to obtain bank loans. Have you had to put up personal collateral (e.g., your house) as a safeguard for a bank loan to be used as a funding source in your company?
(68 %) 14 (30 %) 1 (2 %) 47
Has it been necessary to put up a personal guarantee of repayment as a safeguard for a bank loan to be used as a funding source in your company?
32 (68 %) 13 (28 %) 2 (4 %) 47 Table 7 shows the most commonly mentioned challenges in applying for bank loans for the 47 firms that use bank loans. It should be noted that this was an open-ended question in the survey with no pre-determined alternative. The requirements of collateral and personal guarantees were the problems most cited in applying for bank loans. In other words, as noted in the theoretical framework, these are requirements that more or less make the idea of the corporate form obsolete. The shielding and separation of owners' and firms' wealth do not work. Furthermore, it is noticeable that the interest rate was mentioned as a stepping stone. The requirements on collateral 12 (25.5 %)
The requirements on personal guarantees 6 (13 %)
The bank does not understand the business idea 4 (8.5 %)
The interest rates and terms of credit 3 (6.5 %)
Plans for expansion and financing
A question of expansion plans (Table 8 ) and the financing of these plans (Table 9) revealed that a majority of the firms had plans for expansion. Only 30 percent had no plans. As much as 27 percent of the firms even had plans for expansion abroad. The financing of these plans showed once again that funder equity and founder loans were the most probable sources for these plans (Table 9 ). Bank loans were also a probable source (but not of the same magnitude). Equity and loans from family and friends are a not at all probable source of finance. In other words, this type of relational finance is out of the question. Furthermore, venture capital and funding from business angels are not considered options. 
Summary
Information impactedness and difficulties creating trust are likely to make external financing difficult for entrepreneurs. The statistical results from our survey confirm that picture. Less than 20 percent of the startups received bank loans. Other types of external financing, such as that received from venture capital and business angels funding, are essentially non-existent. In The corporate form implies a separation of personal and firm assets. For startups, the shielding of private assets did not work. The corporate veil was pierced. Two thirds of those who received bank loans had to pledge personal assets as a security, which reduces bank loans for the legal person, the corporate startup, to a financial source of low importance.
In the survey, there was also a future-oriented question about expansion plans (at home and abroad) and the financing of these expansions plans. Even in this case, bank loans were not considered amongst the most probable sources of finance (even though, it in this case, at least it was considered a probable source).
Startups, financing and geography
Data sources
In this section, the survey is complemented with Amadeus data to determine whether location matters for financing and development. Amadeus is a database published by Bureau van Dijk.
It contains information on over 18 million public and private companies in Europe. The database has a good coverage of Swedish corporations and provides information about location and standardized annual reports. The company name stated by the respondents in the survey was used in search of location data. We looked at the last available annual report in Amadeus for location and quantitative financial data (2013 for firms with a fiscal year running from January to December and for 2012 in other cases).
Difficulties locating the surveyed firms in Amadeus and the selection of the thriving firms, in the sense of not being bankrupt and reporting positive sales figures, decreased the number of observations to 192 firms (compared to the 244 firms in the survey). Because the purpose of this part of the study is to analyze the growth expectations and financing of startups, we disregarded firms in a bankruptcy state (because of negative shareholder funds), firms that were part of a group and firms with no sales. The focus is on thriving firms. With these constraints, the number of firms studied is further reduced to 144. The merging of the survey data and the Amadeus data will, in addition to location and financial data, also allow us to investigate how entrepreneur characteristics can influence development plans and financing.
Functional regions
When studying the geographical dimension of the financing and growth of startups, it is useful to look at the different functional regions of a country. Karlsson (2007) offers a review of the research on functional regions. Referring to Johansson (1998) , he writes that "The basic characteristic of a functional region is the integrated labor market, in which inter-regional commuting as well as intra-regional job search and search for labor is much more intensive than the inter-regional counterparts" (Karlsson, 2007 p. 4) . Concepts such as agglomeration, cluster, functional region and industrial districts are, according to Karlsson, used interchangeably. The use of function regions in economic analysis has, from this perspective, a long history. One of the classical economists in the field is Alfred Marshall (1920) . He writes about the advantages of a pooled labor market, the sharing of inputs and information spillovers within an industrial district. 
Data and model
The growth variables used in the analysis will be plans of expansion in Sweden and abroad.
The financial variables to be explained are the prevalence of bank loans today, difficulties in obtaining a bank loan, and financial structure, represented by solvency. These are the dependent variables to be explained. Solvency is quantitative data based on the last available annual report (2013) from Amadeus, whereas the others are qualitative data from the survey. Table 10 for a description of the variables.) Amongst the owner characteristics in Table 4 , there was also earlier working experience. This variable is not included here due to the high correlation with the age of the entrepreneur (see Correlation Matrix, Table A1 in the appendix). Table 11 presents the summary statistics for our selection of thriving startups. The low frequency of bank loans (20.8 %) and the fact that as many as 29.5 percent of the startups have been denied bank loan can be observed. Furthermore, there is comparatively low frequency of startups in rural areas (7.6%). The most popular industry is consulting. The portion of women is 40 percent amongst the thriving entrepreneurs, and more than 60 percent have a college degree (academic exam). To explain how growth plans, access to bank loans and capital structure are affected by location and other control variables, the following type of equation is used:
Outcome variable = f(Entrepreneur Characteristics, Location, industry, profit margin) (1)
The different outcomes to be explained are (1) the prevalence of bank loans (bank loan today),
(2) why firms are denied bank loans, (3) the plans to expand at home and abroad and (4) the capital structure in the form of solvency. Three different hypotheses related to economic geography will be tested. First, we want to see whether the type of FA region where a firm is located has an effect on growth and finance. According to the new geography literature about agglomeration, referred to above, it is hypothesized that the more densely populated a region is, the higher is the propensity to expand the business. Intermediate urban areas can, according to this literature, be expected to be more concentrated on expansion at home, whereas densely populated areas have more of an orientation towards expansion abroad through export (Hypotheses 1 and 2).
The second is a hypothesis inspired by Backman (2013) and Berggren and Silver (2010) . It holds that the information barrier for a bank loan is lower in rural areas. Hence, we also test whether firms in rural area to a larger extent depend on bank loans as an external financial source (Hypothesis 3). Third, based on the competence view of the firm advanced by economic geographers such as Maskell (2001) , it is assumed that entrepreneurial characteristics are useful in a geographical analysis like such as ours Industry and profit margin are used as control variables. The type of industry can affect expansion through the nature of tradable goods and services and affect the possibility to borrow.
Banks can be expected to look both at the presence of collateral and the business future a certain industry represents. Profit margin is a factor that influences all outcome variables. The possibility of obtaining a bank loan, expansion and capital structure are likely to be positively affected by profit margin.
Regression Results
For each of the six outcome variables (expansion at home, expansion abroad, bank loan, bank loan denied, solvency and gearing ratio), a regression was run with entrepreneur characteristics, area location, industry dummies and profit margin as explanatory variables.
As shown in Tables A1 to A5 in the appendix, three different models were used. Explanatory variables in the first model were, other than location, only entrepreneur characteristics. The second model also included industries as control variables, and in the third model, profit margin was added as a control variable.
When the dependent (outcome) variable was a dummy, both OLS (ordinary least square) and marginal probit estimations were used. OLS with a binary dependent variable is to be interpreted as a linear probability model. As in some of the studies described in Table 1 A novelty of this study is the use of location as explanation of expansion plans and finance.
Looking at expansion at home and abroad in the second column, there are significant For ownership characteristics as control variables, there are earlier studies with which to compare our results (see Table 1 ). Five different variables that mirror personal characteristics were used. Being born abroad or Sweden did not make any difference in the five regressions.
Female entrepreneurs had lower solvency than men. Profitability is, as can be expected, important for profitability. The number of startups is negatively related to bank loans.
Entrepreneurs with a history of many startups are more also often denied or abstain from applying for bank loans, which can explain why bank loans are less important in these firms.
It would be interesting to study these earlier startups. Perhaps there is a history of bankruptcies, or they more own funds from earlier successful startups. One indicator of the latter direction is the significant relationship between the number of startups and expansion plans.
Like Storey (1994) , we find that use of bank loans cannot be explained by the other owner characteristics birthplace and gender. However, in our study, age had an effect on being denied or abstaining from searching for a bank loan. Being of age was a negative factor, but this negative effect decreased as age increased. Cassar (2004) finds that leverage (which is the inverse of our solvency measure) cannot be explained by ownership characteristics. However, we find that gender matters. Women have more debt in relation to assets. Robb and Robinson (2010) find that women have less outside equity in relation to assets, which might be interpreted as a similar result. Education does not matter in our study, but it matters in the study of Gartner et al (2012) and Coleman et al (2014) Startups in the construction industry had difficulties with bank financing, and IT and data firms did not have expansion plans at home. Health care firms seemed to have good relations to banks and planned to expand at home. The service firms were somewhat surprisingly not denied bank loans as often as firms in other industries.
The most interesting result from the regressions is, as we see it, that urbanization matters for expansion plans. This appears to us as a new area for studying family startups. The results are highly significant. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (For the OLS regressions, the standard errors are robust.) Remark: Outlier med profitmargin = -3.4 is excluded
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Concluding remarks
Innovations are the primary factor behind growth, according to Solow (1957) . To realize innovative ideas, entrepreneurs need financing. The entrepreneurs with the brightest new ideas are not necessarily the ones with wealth that allows for self-financing. There is also a risk factor to consider. To have to use one's own wealth for collateral and guarantees to finance a startup built on innovative ideas requires an increased personal financial risk.
Hence, access to external financing and risk mitigation are important for the realization of a business idea.
With external financing, a double trust problem has to be solved. The entrepreneur must be assured that the financier can be trusted with sensitive private information. At the same time, the financier must be confident that invested money is not wasted. For the entrepreneur, the corporate form of business is attractive from the perspective of mitigating economic risk. The wealth of the entrepreneur can, at least in theory, be separated from the wealth of the firm.
Bank loans are also attractive because the stealing of ideas is less of a problem than it is with other forms of external financing.
However, the drawback for a new firm is that the bank simultaneously must be certain that money lent out is paid back. One way for the bank to be assured of getting money back with an interest rate is to demand safeguards in the form personal collateral and personal guarantees. A consequence is that the idea behind the corporate form of business is thereby compromised. The separation of personal assets and firm assets is blurred. Bank loans to finance business activities are not given to the legal person, the corporation, but instead to the owner. Seen from that perspective, authors such as Robb and Robinson (2014) are wrong in their assertion that bank loans are not a problem for startups.
An important finding from our survey is that the shielding properties of the corporate form cannot be used. A relatively large proportion of the respondents that were granted bank loans had problems; either they were initially denied bank loans, or that they had to use personal collateral and personal guarantees to obtain a loan. Hence, the results suggest that bank financing does not seem to be a financing option for the majority of Swedish startups.
Personal wealth is a pre-requisite to obtain bank loans, and is at least as important for firms that do not use bank loans.
Adding a geographical dimension, for a reduced sample of thriving startups, we find that location matters for expansion plans. Clustering makes firms more inclined to contemplate expansion. Firms in intermediate urban regions plan more expansion at home, whereas firms in the three most densely populated regions, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, to a larger extent plan to expand their business to foreign markets. There is also geographical difference in bank financing with bank loans more frequent in rural regions.
We consider the most interesting finding from our regressions to be that urbanization matters for expansion plans. This appears to us as a completely new area for study of startups. The results are highly significant. It can, of course, be objected that our sample is small. The response rate in our survey was quite low. However, in light of earlier research on firms in urbanized areas, the results make sense. We are looking forward to further research on how location matters for startups. A data base like the Kauffman Firm Survey with 5000 startups could perhaps also be used for research about location and growth. The database have been used in different published articles as Robb and Robinson (2014) and Coleman, Cotei and Farhat (2014) (see section 2.1.4). It is possible for others to get access to the database.
In response to the questions posed in the abstract, we can summarize our findings that personal wealth is the most important financing source. Almost all financial risk is born by entrepreneurs. The use of bootstrapping in mitigating risk takes primarily the forms of withholding one's own salary, using private credit cards, and running the business at home.
The alternative to bank loans is personal savings. Very few firms in our sample rely on relational financing from families and friends and on external financing from non-bank sources. Location matters for expansion plans; firms in the three most urbanized regions are more prone to expanding their businesses to foreign markets.
The challenge for policy maker is to create incentives for external financiers to invest in startups and find ways to bridge the information barrier between external financiers and startups. One way to raise the interest of external financiers to invest could be to make return on such investments temporary tax exempt. 
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